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when choosing them, can rightfully take definite action
upon amendments or revisions; they must submit the
results of their deliberations to the people—who alone
are competent to exercise the right of sovereignty in
framing the fundamental law—for ratification or rejection. The convention is the representative only in a
very qualified sense, and for the specific purpose, and
with the restricted authority to put in proper form the
questions of amendment upon which the people are to
pass; but the changes in the fundamental law of the
state must be enacted by the people themselves."
There was a time in the past when the doctrine was urged
that the constitutional convention exercised the whole sovereignty rights of the people on the theory that the convention represented the people themselves. This doctrine, however, has never gained much following and is now no longer
advocated.
See Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39. Also Wood's Appeal, 75
Pa. St. 59, where the court said:
"No argument for the implied power of absolute sovereignty in a convention can be drawn from revolutionary times, when necessity begets a new government."
See also
Jameson, Constitutional Conventions, Chap. VI.
Most of the authorities supporting the doctrine above are
drawn from revolutionary secession and territorial conventions which, as we have seen above, are not proper precedents.
The cases above and Mr. Jameson adopt the theory that
a convention can be restricted in its powers by the legislature and that any action of a convention contrary to legislative restrictions is invalid. This view represents an extreme opposite view to the one first mentioned, and it too is
no longer accepted by the best writers and courts.
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See
Dodd, Chap. I I I .
Hoar, Chap. IX.
Braxton, "Powers of Conventions," 7 Va. L. Reg. 79.
29 Harvard Law Rev. 528.
The most modern and what rationally seems to be the most
reasonable view "regards the convention as a regular organ
of the existing government coordinate with the existing
branches. In its sphere of constitution making, it should be
supreme, subject only to the limitation by the people. It
should be free from legislative attempt to limit its powers of
revision; on the other hand, it should probably be subordinate to the legislature in purely legislative matters, * * * ."
See
29 Harvard Law Review, 528 at 530.
Dodd, pp. 80 and 87.
Braxton, "Powers of Conventions," 7 Va. L. Reg. 79
at 96.
Hoar, Chap. IX.
The first Pennsylvania case, Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39,
is the one upon which Judge Jameson bases his case for the
control of the convention by the legislature. Both Judge
Jameson and Braxton wrote in order to avert the doctrine of
conventional supremacy. (Jameson §313; Braxton, 7 Va.
L. R. 79.) But Judge Jameson fails to notice that the second Pennsylvania case proceeded on the theory that the legislature can not limit the convention, but that the people
can and, in the instance before the court, did. (Wood's Appeal. 75 Pa. St. 59.) The language of the case is (pp. 71-2):
" I t is simply evasive to affirm that the legislature can
not limit the right of the people to alter or reform their
government. Certainly it can not. . . . When the people
act through a law, the act is theirs, and the fact that
they used the legislature as their instrument to confer
their powers makes them the superiors and not the legislature."
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Even Jameson refused to admit the logical extremities of
his theory,—for example, he took the position that legislative interference with a convention must be (p. 364),
"subject to the limitation, that its requirements must be
in harmony with the principles of the convention system,
or rather, not inconsistent with the exercise by the convention, to some extent, of its essential and characteristic function."
This admission, as both Dodd and Hoar note, "knocks the
very bottom out of the theory of legislative supremacy."
Hoar, p. 114; Dodd, p. 73.
The independence of conventions from legislative restriction has been frequently announced judicially. In Loomis vs.
Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613, 708, the court laid down as fundamental principles:
"First. That a constitutional convention lawfully
convened does not derive its powers from the legislature,
but from the people.
"Second. That the powers of a constitutional convention are in the nature of sovereign powers.
"Third. That the legislature can neither limit nor
restrict them in the exercise of these powers."
In Carleton vs. Secretary of State (1908), 151 Mich. 337,
115 N. W. 429, the Chief Justice said:
"By necessary implication, the legislature is prohibited from any control over the method of revising the
constitution. The convention is an independent and
sovereign body. . . . I t is elected by the people, answerable to the people, and its work must be submitted to the
people through their electors for approval and disapproval."
Judge Hooker, who dissented in that case, said:
"The convention has a sphere in which the legislature
can not intrude, a discretion that it can not control."
Mr. Dodd sums up the matter of legislative restrictions
thus, (pp. 91, 9 2 ) :
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"The restrictions placed upon conventions have certainly not in practice been recognized as of binding
force, except in a few cases, and theoretically the convention in the performance of its proper functions
should be independent of the regular legislative organs
of the state. Legislative acts are usually necessary for
the assembling of conventions, but this dependence of
conventions upon legislatures has as yet caused few
conflicts."
•

•

*

"As a rule, then, constitutional conventions are subject only to the following restrictions: (1) those contained in or implied from provisions in the existing
state and federal constitutions, and (2) in the absence
of constitutional provisions, those derived or implied
from the limited functions of conventions."
Hoar makes his own conclusion thus (p. 115) :
"From all the foregoing we see that the legislature
probably has no power to restrict either an authorized
or a popular convention; whenever it has succeeded
this has been due more to force of circumstances than
to legal rights. Even the power to impose reasonable
restrictions is doubtful."
The chief difficulty in connection with this question as to
how f a r the convention is subject to legislative control is
where to draw the line as to the scope of the convention's independent sphere. The particular issue on which the decision is most important concerns the adoption of the constitution drawn by the convention. A t the start of this section
we read Judge Cooley's view t h a t the proposed constitution
must be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection.
The overwhelming weight of historical precedents sustains
this. (See Dodd, p. 62, et seq.) I t is the mode of adoption
most consonant with the theory of the constitution emanating from the sovereign people. (The constitution of every
state admitted to the union since 1836 has been approved by

322
the people. Dodd, p. 64, note 72.) Those instances in which
historical precedent has departed from this step have been
almost exclusively confined to the Revolutionary and Civil
W a r periods. The other instances where proposed constitutions have not been submitted to the people chiefly arose in
the South after the Civil W a r from the conventions called
to disenfranchise the negroes and in which the democratic
principle of the sovereignty of the people was abandoned and
only a pretense of legitimacy maintained.
Judge Jameson says, pp. 490-91:
"An important part of the duty of a convention is to
submit to the sovereign for its approval the propositions of constitutional law which it has matured.
"The duty of submission grows out of the nature of
our institutions."
and on p. 494:
"But suppose there has been no submission to the
people, no means used to collect their opinion upon
the question, aside from precedents, would the legislature then be competent to authorize definite action by a
convention, or the latter be empowered to take it? The
answer must be in the negative."
Hoar also is of the opinion that the prevailing law requires submission to the people. He says, p. 195:
"We have already seen that it is the general custom
to submit constitutional changes to the people, even
when not required by the express terms of the convention act. In fact, there have been expressions of opinion to the effect t h a t the action of an extra-constitutional convention has no validity until ratified by the
people."
Hoar quotes Judge Marcus Morton of Massachusetts, who
in connection with the Massachusetts convention of 1853
aptly expressed the principles involved. Hoar, p. 196, Deb.
Mass. Conv. 1853, Vol. 1, p. 75:
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"If the people choose to adopt what we submit to
them, it then becomes authoritative—not because it
comes from a legally constituted body, but because the
people choose to adopt it."
The subsidiary question to this one of submission is what
body controls the submission. Is the manner and time of
submission within the field in which the convention has independent authority, or is it within the field in which the
legislature is authoritative? The latter view is the one
naturally adopted by Judge Jameson and the one held by the
two Pennsylvania cases, Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39, and
Woods Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59. However, in New Hampshire
the Opinion of the Justices, 76 N. H. 612; in Michigan, Carlton vs. Sec. of State, 151 Mich. 337; and in Missouri, State
vs. Neal, 42 Mo. 119, are of a different opinion. Hoar sustains
the right of the convention to prescribe the details of submission (p. 197). He says:
"When the time for submission is prescribed by the
convention act, can the convention change the time?
This must needs be within the inherent powers of a
convention, even tho the convention act be popular
rather than legislative. Otherwise the whole procedure
might come to nought because of a technical restriction."
Dodd also shows that control over submission is a matter
within the convention's independent authority (pp. 87-8).
He says:
"Upon the larger question as to whether a constitution shall or shall not be submitted to the people, and
as to the method of submission if it is submitted, although there is little authority either way, it would
seem t h a t the legislature cannot bind a convention;
Wells vs. Bain and Judge Jameson's work are the only
authorities supporting to its full extent the theory of
conventional subordination to the legislature. Judge
Jameson took the ground that the submission of a con-
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stitution is an act within the power of the ordinary
legislature, but it is difficult to look upon it otherwise
than as a step in the framing of a constitution. To
admit that after a convention has acted the legislature
may submit its work in any way it thinks proper, or
may defeat the proposed constitution by refusing to
submit it at all (if the existing constitution requires
such submission), is practically to destroy the value of
the convention as an independent organ."
In Loomis vs. Jackson, 6 W. Ya. 613, 708, and in Sproule
vs. Fredericks, 69 Miss. 898, dicta, uphold the convention's
freedom from legislative restrictions. In the last case the
court expressly says the legislature has no power to require
a convention to submit its work to the people, but in that
instance the legislature had not made any effort so to restrict
the convention.
The questions asked by the Governor on this particular
matter are:
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power
if the General Assembly should provide by law:
" ( d ) for the organization and conduct of such convention ;
" ( e ) for the submission to the people for their ratification and adoption, of any constitution or amendments proposed by such convention : "
In view of the above authorities, the leading ones
in this country on the subject, it is seen that the modern
view is that the convention is a separate organ of the sovereign state which is independent within its own field; that
its scope of authority extends to the conduct of its proceedings, and the submission of its work to the people. If this
were not so, the convention would be so hedged in by legislative enactment that it would become the servant of and
express the will of the legislature and not of the people.
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We would submit to the Court that in answering questions (d) and (e) that the answer should be: That the legislature cannot limit the powers of the convention to act
upon either of these subject matters.
SUMMARY RE CONVENTION

PROCEDURE

I t would be unfortunate indeed if the people lost a first
opportunity to express their views as to the calling of a convention. It would also be a further misfortune if the people
lost the opportunity to vote upon the election of all of the
personnel who are to represent them in the framing of the
new Constitution. Finally, it is of the highest importance
that the people and the people alone should vote upon the
ratification or rejection of the work of their convention. The
omission of either one of the three steps in taking a vote of
the people would be unfortunate, but it might be a complete
failure as an expression of the will of the people if either the
first or last were omitted. Further, such a course of action
would result in a speeding up of the processes by which a
new Constitution is made to such an extent that the people
would fail to grasp the situation and act intelligently, and
"our Conventions would become the arenas, and our Constitutions the objects as well as the instruments of party conflict." (Jameson, Sec. 532).
Fortunately, constitutional law as propounded by the authorities above cited forbids: (1) the calling of a constitutional convention by the General Assembly before first receiving authority to do so by a referendum to the people;
(2) the interference in any manner by the legislature with
the right of the people to elect all the delegates to a constitutional convention, thereby prohibiting the legislature from
authorizing the General Officers of the state to be members
of such convention : and (3) the General Assembly exercising
any control whatever over the action or work of the conven-
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tion. Such being the law, the inquiry of the governor insofar
as it affects these subjects of discussion should be answered
in the negative.

V. THE FRAMERS OF OUR CONSTITUTION INTENDED THAT THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD
NOT BE ALTERED THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
In view of the constitutional experience of the people of
Rhode Island during the half century prior to 1842, no one
will deny that they were ignorant of the fact that a constitution could not only be framed but also could be altered or
amended through the medium of a constitutional convention. For example, they had before them the constitution
of the United States, which provides as one of two methods
of amendment, for the calling of a convention by Congress
for proposing amendments upon the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states and for the ratification of
such proposals by conventions in three-fourths of the states.
Moreover, they had before them the original constitutions of
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Pennsylvania and
Georgia, which provided for amendment by a constitutional
convention only, whereas the original constitutions of Maryland, Delaware and South Carolina made provision for constitutional amendments by legislative proposal only.
None of the original state constitutions provided for
amendment by both methods, and during the first sixty years
only four constitutions so provided, namely, that of the
United States of 1787, those of Delaware of 1792 and 1831,
and that of South Carolina of 1790. In other words, the convention of 1842 was confronted with a choice of adopting one
or both of two well recognized methods of amending the new
constitution.
There is, of course, the third possibility of omitting to
mention any method of amendment, which was the fact in
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connection with six of the original revolutionary state constitutions. For a more detailed statement of the existing situation see Dodd, "The Revision and Amendment of State
Constitutions" (1910), pp. 118 ff.
However, in view of the fact that the charter of 1663 contained no provision for its amendment and in view of the difficulty experienced by the people of Rhode Island prior to
1842 in bringing about changes in their government, it can
hardly be questioned that when the delegates framed the
constitution of 1842 they intended to make a definite choice
with reference to the manner in which the document should
thereafter be altered or amended and that their choice was
given expression in the provisions of Article X I I I .
I t is submitted that a mere statement of the existing situation is a conclusive answer to any argument that the convention method of amendment was intended by its framers to
be authorized by the constitution. However, if further arguments are deemed necessary, it may be profitable to pursue
the subject further.
The brief statement of the constitutional history of Rhode
Island contained herein and in Appendix A clearly indicates
that the experience of the people of Rhode Island with constitutional conventions had been sufficiently unfortunate to
discredit its further usefulness. For more than half a century agitation for a convention had been a disturbing element in the political life of the state. The two great issues
before the people were (1) the extension of the suffrage to
others than landholders and (2) the reapportionment of
representation in the General Assembly; otherwise the
framework of government and its administration was generally satisfactory to the people and, as a matter of fact,
the constitution of 1842 provides for a government which
differs little from the pre-existing government, except in
these two important particulars. Accordingly, if a conven-
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tion could have been held which would have altered the existing government in these particulars, it is reasonable to
hold that the agitation for further conventions would have
ceased. However, in the absence of specific provision for
amending the existing government, the people realized that
the only reasonable method of accomplishing the desired reforms was through the means of a constitutional convention,
whereby they could reduce to writing in one document the
essential features of their existing government and certain
desired reforms.
But history shows that although the people were agreed
as to the fundamental method of effecting the desired
changes, there was great difficulty in getting a convention
organized and in securing the acceptance by the people of the
work of any particular convention. Thus in 1821 and 1822
the freemen expressed their unwillingness to have a convention, and although a convention was held in 1824, the proposed constitution was rejected at the polls. A second convention was held in 1834 and adjourned without accomplishing anything. Likewise the landholders convention of 1841
accomplished nothing, and it was only the painful experience culminating immediately in the Dorr Rebellion that
resulted in our present constitution being adopted in 1842.
Such being the experience of the people of Rhode Island with
constitutional conventions, it is not surprising that in framing a new constitution they declared in effect that they
would have none of it, but instead chose the other generally
accepted method of amending constitutions, to wit, proposals by the general assembly to the people.
The conclusion above stated appears particularly sound
in view of the fact that the Landholders' Constitution, the
Peoples' Constitution and the Constitution of 1842 contained an Article X I I I which were practically identical, except that the Peoples' Constitution required a majority in-
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stead of a three-fifths vote to make legislative proposals for
amendments effective.
I t may be argued that since there is no express prohibition
of the convention method of amendment, it is to be assumed
that the framers of the constitution intended that that
method was to be exercised as it had been under the charter
government, However, it is clear from what has already
been said in the course of argument that the political leaders
and scholars of the day realized that as theretofore utilized
a constitutional convention was an agency of revolution or
of constitutional necessity, because it was not specifically
authorized by the existing government, whether it be called a
constitutional government or a charter government. Accordingly, if it were intended that the convention method
was thereafter to be regarded as a constitutional method of
amendment, the framers would have so stated in the constitution as specifically as they stated that amendments could
be made by the legislative proposal method. They would
not have run the risk of having their intention thwarted by
f u t u r e political controversy.
Further, if the delegates had intended and decided that
the convention method of amendment was thereafter to be
constitutional, they would not only have said so in the Constitution, but they would have made suitable provision for
the manner of calling, qualifications of delegates, organization, rules of procedure, and method for carrying into effect
the changes adopted by the convention. As has already been
indicated, these details had already assumed significant importance in previous convention experiences. Moreover, the
law was by no means clear whether a convention was compelled to submit its work to the people, whether it was required to conform to rules of procedure laid down by the
legislature, or whether it was itself the judge of the manner
in which the new constitution or amendments were to be
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promulgated. These were serious and difficult questions, and
it is a sad commentary upon the intelligence and political
foresight of the delegates to say that knowing these difficulties, they intended the convention method to be constitutional
and left open to f u t u r e debate such important details. The
omission to say anything about such matters is silent testimony to the fact that the convention method and all that
concerns it was intentionally omitted and never intended to
be constitutionally employed. On this phase of the situation
see
12 C. J., pp. 684-687.
Moreover, there was no need of an express prohibition of
a constitutional convention in our constitution, since under
constitutional government the exercise of a revolutionary
right is always prohibited by any constitution. I t is nonsense to urge that unless a constitution prohibits revolution,
a revolutionary act is thereby constitutional. But as has already been argued, the presence of Article X I I I is in effect a
prohibition of the convention method and the argument
should stop there. In view of the experience of Rhode Island
with revolution, it can hardly be argued that the delegates of
1842 were ignorant of the principle involved and had any
other intent than to make the legislative proposal method exclusive of all others.
By adopting the method provided by Article X I I I , the
delegates chose the method adopted by approximately half
the constitutions then existing. However, it differed from
many in certain details, and it is submitted that in adopting
such details the delegates intended to exclude the convention
method. Briefly stated, Article X I I I provides that two
legislatures must favor a proposed amendment before
it can be submitted to the people and that the proposed amendment can become effective only by a threefifths affirmative vote of the electors voting. In other
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states it is sometimes provided that the proposal go
before only one legislature before being submitted to
the people; in still others the proportion of the popular
vote necessary for adoption is more or less than three-fifths.
On the other hand, a constitutional convention is usually
called upon the affirmative vote of a majority of the people,
is organized and does its work within a short time thereafter,
and the new constitution or amendments may or may not be
submitted to the people for adoption. Thus it will be observed that under the provisions of Article X I I I the delegates developed a method of amendment which required (1)
consideration by one legislature, (2) a waiting period for
consideration by the people before the next election, (3) consideration by a second legislature, (4) action by the people
after ample opportunity for discussion, and (5) adoption by
a three-fifths popular vote. I t is submitted that it is mere idle
talk to argue that although the delegates incorporated into
Article X I I I so deliberate a method of amendment, nevertheless, they intended an alternative method to be available,
which would permit amendments to be made hastily and
without the opportunity for cold reason to replace the impetuous heat of an aggressive political campaign. The mere
reading of Article X I I I is a sufficient answer to any such
attempted argument.
Finally, it is submitted that the very framework and content of the Constitution as it was adopted in 1842 shows an
intent to eliminate the constitutional convention method of
amending its provisions. May it be said to the credit of the
delegates that they well understood the fundamental principles of American constitutional government and fully realized the purpose of a written constitution of government as
defined at the beginning of this brief; to wit,
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"That fundamental law of a state which contains the
principles on which government is founded, regulates
the division of sovereign powers, and directs to what
persons each of these powers is to be intrusted and
the manner of its exercise."
Rarely will one find a constitution of government which
measures up to the foregoing conception more than that of
the State of Rhode Island. I t contains the usual Bill of
Rights, qualifications of electors, the departments of government and their powers, provisions governing elections, a
declaration regarding education, a provision for amendments, and no more. Every provision is basic and fundamental and obviously intended to be lasting and permanent.
Such being the nature of the provisions contained in t h e
document and such being the obvious intent of its founders,
it requires little argument to demonstrate that any amendments thereto were intended to be of the same nature and
were intended to be equally permanent, As originally drafted
the constitution contained provisions which were well recognized by the charter government or had been the subject of
public discussion for half a century. When it came to drafting a new constitution, the framers knew what they wanted,
the only real dispute centering about the franchise and
method of apportionment for representatives. Accordingly,
it cannot be said that the constitution itself was drafted in
haste. But above all it embodied principles which our ancestors hoped would never change. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that the method of amendment incorporated into
the instrument was one which required ample time for discussion and deliberation and more than a majority of the
popular vote before any change could be made effective. When
one contrasts the safeguards inherent in the method adopted
with the risks incident to a constitutional convention, there
can be no doubt that the framers of the constitution intended
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to exclude the latter as a constitutional method of amendment.
I t is submitted, therefore, t h a t there can be no question
that the f r a m e r s of our constitution intended to exclude the
convention method of amendment, because (1) such method
is not specified although well known to the f r a m e r s ; (2) the
experience of the people of Rhode Island with such method
had been unsatisfactory; (3) the provisions of Article X I I I
are contained in the Landowners' Constitution, the Peoples'
Constitution and the Constitution of 1842, and the convention method is not mentioned therein; (4) no procedure is
provided f o r the employment of such method, whereas detailed procedure is provided in Article X I I I for the employment of the legislative proposal method; (5) such method is
omitted, despite the fact t h a t it was specifically mentioned
in certain constitutions authorizing both methods; (6) the
conservative procedure required in employing the legislative
proposal method negatives any alleged intent to authorize
the more radical procedure of the convention method; and
(7) the obvious, intended f u n d a m e n t a l n a t u r e and obvious,
intended permanency of the Constitution indicates an intent
to effect changes only by the deliberate method provided by
Article X I I I .
C O N C L U S I O N
I. THE R H O D E ISLAND C O N S T I T U T I O N CAN BE
LEGALLY REVISED OR AMENDED ONLY AS ALL O W E D IN ARTICLE XIII.
II. EVEN IF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CAN CALL
A C O N S T I T U T I O N A L CONVENTION, IT MUST
FIRST RECEIVE A U T H O R I T Y T O D O S O BY A
REFERENDUM T O THE PEOPLE.
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III. IF A CONSTITUTIONAL C O N V E N T I O N
IS
CALLED, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS N O
POWER TO PROVIDE THAT THE GENERAL
OFFICERS OF THE STATE SHALL BY VIRTUE
OF THEIR OFFICES BE MEMBERS O F SUCH
CONVENTION.
IV. IF A CONSTITUTIONAL C O N V E N T I O N
IS
CALLED, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS NO
POWER T O CONTROL THE ACTION OR WORK
OF SUCH CONVENTION.
V. THE FRAMERS OF OUR CONSTITUTION INTENDED THAT THE CONSTITUTION S H O U L D
NOT BE ALTERED THROUGH THE MEDIUM O F
A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
So far as we have been able to determine, there is no legal
precedent supporting the proponents in their position that
the legislature may directly call a constitutional convention
under any constitution similar to our own. On the other
hand, there are authorities directly against them, as we have
shown.
However, it is to the Rhode Island constitutional history,
to the Rhode Island conditions and to the Rhode Island Supreme Court that we should look almost exclusively for
guidance in determining the intention of the people of Rhode
Island when they adopted the amendment section of the
Rhode Island Constitution.
In 1883 it was the unanimous opinion of the justices of
this Court that the legislature could not call a constitutional
convention, even for the purpose of framing a new Constitution, much less for the purpose of amending the present
Constitution. Technically, the opinion may not be binding
upon the present justices of this Court, not being rendered
in a litigated case. However, it is more than the expression
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of the unanimous opinion of five learned men; it is the opinion of the justices of this Court given in their official capacity
as such. I t has been acquiesced in by the people for over
fifty years. No action has ever been taken contrary thereto.
The accepted interpretation of our own Constitution by the
justices of our own Supreme Court for these reasons and because of its soundness should not be lightly cast aside.
A constitution is a people's document. It should be construed with common sense and not given any strained or
legalistic interpretation. The pettifogger is out of his element in constitutional law.
The framers of the Constitution and the people in adopting the Constitution of 1842 understood clearly the nature
of a constitution. They knew t h a t they were setting up a
framework of government and delegating to their representatives in the several branches of the government certain
powers. They welcomed the opportunity to set down in
writing certain rights which were not to be interfered with
by their government. They were also fully aware of the fact
that they were tying their own hands for the protection of
minorities and individuals in their rights. They realized
also that time might demonstrate the necessity of making
changes in the written Constitution and they therefore inserted an amendment article providing the means of their
choice for changing the compact.
They needed no citation of legal precedents to inform
them that if a constitution contains no provision for its
amendment, it may be amended by a majority of the people
in an orderly manner at any time. They had lived for one
hundred and eighty years under a charter which had no provision for its amendment. They knew that it could be
amended at will by the English Crown up to the time that
they adopted the charter, after they had thrown off allegiance to the Mother Country; and that after that time it
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could be amended by themselves, but just how, was a troublesome question.
On this occasion, they wanted to make it perfectly clear
that the Constitution could be amended and to define in
great detail in the instrument itself exactly how this could
be accomplished. They undoubtedly considered the amendment article one of the most important provisions of the
Constitution.
If ever a people in framing a Constitution had in mind
the desirability of providing clearly just how the Constitution could be amended, it was the people of Rhode Island in
1842, who had just experienced great distress caused by
contention as to whether the Constitution under which they
were living (the adopted charter) could be amended and if
so, in exactly what manner.
The people at that time had before them the constitutions
of many states. They had that of New Hampshire which
had been adopted in the Revolutionary period. This provided
for its amendment only through a constitutional convention.
They had the United States Constitution which provided
for the alternative methods, through legislative proposals
and through a constitutional convention. They had also a
very large number of constitutions of other states which
had been adopted from time to time as well as those of the
other states which were then in force.
They knew that in many of the constitutions the legislative proposal method was the only one incorporated in the
amendment clauses. They saw a great variety of ways set
out for amending constitutions by the legislative proposal
method. In some, more than a majority of the legislature
was required for the proposal of an amendment. In others,
amendments could be proposed by one legislature or one legislature proposed and a succeeding legislature approved
before amendments were submitted to the people. They ob-
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served that the adoption by the people was in some cases
by a majority vote and in others by more than a majority
vote.
They had knowledge of other constitutions which in addition to the legislative proposal method had adopted the constitutional convention method. Where the convention method
was used in the amendment clauses they found a great variety of safeguards. In some cases the legislatures were authorized to call conventions at their will. In others, conventions were to be called periodically. In still others, the
legislatures were not permitted to call conventions but were
authorized to submit the question to the people at any time
as to whether a constitutional convention should be held.
Sometimes this question was to be submitted to the people
by the legislature at stated periods or in definite years.
They found provisions that the work of conventions became effective in some cases upon a vote of the majority of
the people and in other cases upon a vote of a larger proportion of the people; either of the total number of people voting on the proposition or of the total number of people voting at the general election. I t had been provided in some
constitutions t h a t constitutional conventions were themselves authorized to adopt and promulgate revisions or
amendments without reference to the people.
The people of this state in 1842 chose not to adopt for the
amendment of their Constitution the convention method
which was in such favor in many of the states. They selected
the legislative proposal method and that alone. They surrounded it with unusual safeguards. They required that one
legislature should propose an amendment and that after an
intervening election another legislature should approve the
amendment before it should even be submitted to them. Upon
submission, the proposed and approved amendment was to
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have a three-fifths vote before it should become a part of the
Constitution.
I t is not difficult to see why the people of Rhode Island did
not choose to adopt the convention method for the revision
or amendment of their Constitution. They had seen the
convention method used in all the other states and, in some
states, on more than one occasion. They had never liked the
convention method, however, as evidenced by the fact that
they postponed until 1842 the holding of a convention for
the revision of the adopted charter, decades after all other
original states had adopted constitutions.
They had the true conception of what a constitution should
be. They kept it short and simple like the United States
Constitution. They incorporated in it only the fundamentals
of government. They recognized that it might need amendment but they believed that they had set up a framework of
government which would be permanent in its essentials. They
felt that while a constitutional convention might be desirable or even necessary in setting up a new constitutional
government, it was ill adapted for the making of amendments.
Once having an established and stable government under
their written Constitution, they could see no further occasion for doing the job over again. The people of Rhode Island
felt then that while their Constitution might be amended, it
would be a permanent instrument just as the people of the
United States as a whole feel now, and have always felt, that
the United States Constitution is a permanent document, to
be amended as necessity may dictate but not to be replaced.
The curb the people put upon themselves in the strict requirements of the use of the legislative proposal method
clearly shows that they had no liking for speed in the amendment of their Constitution. If there is one thing which recommends the constitutional convention method it is its speed.
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Before the people themselves were allowed to pass upon
an amendment under the amendment clause which they
adopted, they required two legislatures to act upon a proposed amendment with an intervening election giving time
for careful consideration and reconsideration. They knew
that if the convention method were permitted, a convention
could be called and its work completed and submitted to
them for their consideration within two or three months, or
even in less time. How reckless the convention method must
have looked to them when under it at any time on about two
months' notice they might find themselves presented with the
problem of expressing their will upon amendments or even
a complete revision.
The convention method may well have seemed to them
dangerous because of the possibility that the delegates to a
convention, taking the position that they were the representatives of the sovereign people, might not only propose
amendments or revisions but might actually adopt and promulgate them. The people of Rhode Island in 1842 had examples before them in other states where this very thing had
been done by conventions.
I t is always the intent of the framers of this Constitution
and of the people in adopting it, at which we are trying to
arrive. If it were their intention to permit their Constitution to be revised or amended by a constitutional convention,
would they not have said so, if only for the purpose of safeguarding themselves as carefully in the use of the constitutional convention method as they did in the use of the legislative proposal method?
I t is unthinkable that they should tie their own hands so
that they could not even have presented to them for consideration a proposal emanating from the legislature until it
had been passed upon by two legislatures with an intervening election and that in addition they should require for a
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valid expression of their will a three-fifths vote of the people
themselves,—while at the same time they understood that
they were leaving it entirely to the legislature as to whether
to submit to them the question of calling a convention, as to
when to call a convention either for a revision or amendment
of the Constitution, leaving it entirely to the legislature or
the convention to decide whether a revision or amendment
should be adopted by the convention itself or submitted to
the people and whether by a majority or other proportionate
vote. The answer of course is clear that the people intended
to safeguard the Constitution against their own hasty action
and believed that they had done so by incorporating in the
amendment clause a very stringent legislative proposal
method—and no other!
The people of Rhode Island knew in 1842, as they have
known continuously since that time, that if at any time they
should change their minds and should desire a convention, it
could be legally and constitutionally provided for. The
amendment clause of the Constitution is as susceptible of
amendment as any other clause of the Constitution.
In 1882 an amendment to the Constitution was submitted
to the people, after passing two legislatures with an intervening election, providing for a change in the amendment
clause to make the calling of a constitutional convention possible under the Constitution. The people refused to adopt
this amendment. They were still of the same mind as in 1842.
They chose not to make the constitutional convention method
a legal method. Furthermore, in 1898 and in 1899 the people rejected a revised constitution containing a provision
that every twenty years the electors should decide whether
there should be a convention to revise the constitution. This
is the last word of the people of Rhode Island.
The opinion of the justices of 1883 came as no surprise
to the people of this state. It was an opinion which the
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man on the street could easily understand. In his clubs, in
his corporations, in his church societies, and in his labor and
fraternal organizations, he knew that he looked to the
amendment clause—and to the amendment clause only—to
find whether the by-laws, articles of association or constitution could be amended, and how. If he found an amendment
clause at all, he knew that what the amendment clause said
was binding upon him and his associates. If he found that
the instrument permitted amendments upon proposals by an
executive committee or board of directors and upon a twothirds vote of the general membership—he knew that that
was t h a t ! If he found that an amendment might be made if
proposed at one meeting of the members and acted upon at
a further meeting and then by a three-fifths vote—he knew
that that was t h a t ! I t would never occur to him that the
amendment clauses had to state anything more than the
permissive way or ways in which the documents could be
amended. He knew also that if he and his associates did
not like an amendment clause, it could be changed—by the
method set out in the instrument.
Therefore, when he read that the justices of the Supreme
Court had found that the only constitutional way in which
the Constitution of Rhode Island could be amended was in
accordance with the legislative proposal method set out in
the amendment clause, he read something which appealed
to his common sense. I t was in accordance with his understanding of the purpose of amendment clauses in the
instruments with which he was entirely familiar in his
daily life. He did not expect to find in the amendment
clause of the Constitution a prohibition against all other
possible methods of amending the Constitution. He did not
find in any of the by-laws, articles of association or constitutions with which he was familiar, in addition to the
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statement of the permissive way or ways of amending them,
a complete statement of the prohibited ways.
He may not have known the meaning of the Latin phrase
used by the justices, expressio unius est exolusio alterius.
He did know, however, that when the people said in the
Constitution that it might be amended by the legislative
proposal method—that was t h a t !
From the time of the Declaration of Independence, American citizens have always held that governments are instituted among men to secure their inherent, inalienable rights
among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
It is no new principle that governments derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed and that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these
rights, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it.
Every school boy knows that.
The people of Rhode Island reasserted in the first provision of their Constitution this right of revolution. The Articles of Confederation were adopted after a bloody revolution ; the Constitution of the United States, a f t e r a peaceful
revolution in passing from the Confederation to the Union.
The State of Rhode Island was born of revolution. Our
Revolutionary forefathers are revered, not scorned.
This right of the people by a revolution, which may be
peaceful or otherwise, to change their form of government
when it ceases to preserve their inalienable rights of life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness is expressed in one
form or another in most of the constitutions of the states.
It exists where it is not expressed. I t is, however, a right of
revolution. Hence by its very nature it is outside the constitution, i. e., unconstitutional.
Section 1 of Article I of our own Constitution reads as
follows:
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" I n the words of the F a t h e r of his Country, we declare t h a t the 'basis of our political systems is the right
of the people to make and alter their constitutions of
government; but t h a t the constitution which at any
time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic
act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon
all.'"
There speaks in the first clause,
"the basis of our political systems is the right of the
people to make and alter their constitutions of government;"
Washington, the proud revolutionist, who had no apology
to make to anyone for the assertion of the right of revolution.
But there speaks in the second clause,
" b u t t h a t the constitution which a t any time exists, till
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole
people, is sacredly obligatory upon all."
Washington, the constitutional statesman, who holds that
the Constitution is a sacred document subject to change
only by the people in a constitutional manner until such
time as it shall be scrapped by revolution.
W e cannot look to this section for authority to amend
the Constitution in a constitutional manner.
Whether the people of Rhode Island are ready for a
peaceful revolution, in pursuance of the inherent right declared in Article I, Section 1, in order to get rid of the
present Constitution in whole or in part, may be a moot
question. Even if it could be demonstrated that all the people of the state, including the justices of this Court, are in
favor of asserting this right of the people to scrap or amend
the Constitution, through a constitutional convention and
a majority vote of the people or otherwise, it would still be
the duty of the justices of this Court to advise that such
action would be extra-constitutional and in the exercise of
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the inalienable, inherent right of revolution to which expression is given in said Article I, Section 1. I t would be
the duty of the justices of this Court to be the last five men
in the state to give their judicial approval to the amendment
of the Constitution in any other manner than that set out
in the Constitution itself. As citizens, the justices of this
Court might feel that the end justifies the means; as judges
of the Supreme Court, to whom the preservation of the
Constitution is sacredly entrusted, they cannot fail to stand
by the Constitution.
But it is said that constitutions of other states have repeatedly been changed, altered and amended by constitutional conventions. In many of these states the constitutional convention method is one of the methods authorized
by the Constitutions in the amendment sections. The constitutions in many of these states through repeated revisions have become mere compilations of laws, containing
hundreds of sections and tens of thousands of words. In
these states, conventions specifically authorized by the contitutions have become little more than superior legislatures,
which must be called frequently to satisfy the requirements
of passing fads and experiments in government.
It is true that in some states having provisions in their
constitutions similar to our own, conventions have been
held. In these states, however, questions have come before
the courts after the fact. A convention has been held and
a new Constitution adopted. Officers have been elected under the new Constitution and the new government, including the judges of the Court, have been duly sworn to support
the new Constitution. The government under the replaced
Constitution has disappeared and the people have peacefully acquiesced. A question then arises in the new Court
under the new Constitution as to whether the new Constitution is valid and binding upon the people. The Court
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has DO hesitation in saying that such new Constitution is
valid. The decision could not be otherwise.
This situation would arise in Rhode Island before this
Court, if a convention were held and a Constitution emanating from the convention were adopted and acquiesced in by
the people. This Court, sitting under the new Constitution
and sworn to uphold it, would find no difficulty whatever in
saying that the new Constitution is legal and would have no
difficulty in recognizing a successful revolution when it saw
one.
If the people should acquiesce in the holding of a convention and in the adoption of a new Constitution, possibly not
a ripple of disturbance would be observed and it might be
very difficult for the average citizen to realize that a peaceful revolution had taken place. Nevertheless this would be
the fact. The point here is that the Governor has raised the
question before the fact and this Court has sworn to uphold
this Constitution.
It is interesting to observe in this connection that in every
state but one, where the question has been raised, the delegates to a constitutional convention cannot be required to
take an oath to support the existing constitution. They are
only required to swear to support the Constitution of the
United States and to perform their duty as delegates faithfully. In the excepted state by a vote of the people when
they authorized the calling of the convention, the delegates
were required to take an oath to support the constitution
of the state. It is somewhat anomalous, to say the least,
if the justices of this Court who are sworn to uphold the
Constitution, can sanction the calling of a convention, the
delegates to which cannot be forced to swear to uphold the
Constitution!
Rhode Island is one of only seven states in which the
justices of the Supreme Court may be asked in advance
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whether a proposed action is or is not constitutional. It
cannot be too strongly emphasized that this Court is sitting
under our present Constitution and not under a new Constitution. I t must acknowledge the fact that the people have
the right to make or alter their Constitution as they see
fit and set up a new government at their pleasure. "While
recognizing this right, we believe the justices of this Court
must say, as the justices of this Court said in 1883, that
the only way in which the Constitution can be amended
in a constitutional manner is by the method provided in
Article X I I I . What action the people or their representatives may choose to take thereafter is no concern of this
Court.
It is, therefore, submitted that it is the duty of the justices of this Court to answer the Governor's question, in all
its parts, in the negative.
Respectfully submitted,
R I C H A R D S . ALDRICH
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APPENDIX A
Chronology Re Rhode Island Constitutional History
Following are notes regarding events which have occurred in Rhode Island constitutional history in connection with the agitation for and accomplishment of
constitutional changes from the date of the American
Revolution to the present time.
1776

In 1776, the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations existed and was governing itself in pursuance of and in accordance with the Charter which had
been granted to it by King Charles the Second of
England under date of July 8, 1663.
On May 4, 1776 the General Assembly of the Colony
of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, at Newport, repealed an act of allegiance to Great Britain
theretofore adopted and voted that thereafter the name
and authority of the King be omitted from all official
documents and transactions and that thereafter, in
place of the King's authority, the name and authority
of the Governor and Company of the English Colony
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of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations shall
appear.
Vol. V I I Colonial Records P. 522.
On July 18, 1776 the General Assembly at Newport,
having learned of the passage of the Declaration of Independence by the Continental Congress at Philadelphia on July 4th of that year approved the same and
changed the name of the colony to "State of Rhode
Island and Providence Plantations."
Vol. V I I Colonial Records P. 581.
1777

At South Kingstown September 22, 1777 the General Assembly voted that His Honor the Deputy Governor, Henry Ward, William Channing, Jonathan Arnold and Rowse J. Helene, Esqs. be a committee, they,
or the major part of them, to form a plan of government for this State and lay the same before this Assembly as soon as conveniently may be.
Vol. V I I I Colonial Records P. 304.

1783

In February 1783 at Providence, the General Assembly adopted a preamble and resolution substantially as follows—
Whereas, it appears, * * * that a number of audacious persons, in contempt of all authority of this
State, and in direct violation of the laws therein existing, have attempted to subvest the present constitution; and whereas * * * etc. et.
Vol. I X Colonial Records 635.
N. B. We fail to find in the Colonial Records any
earlier reference to a constitution; but, by this reference, the Charter must be intended.

1792

At the February Session 1792 the question of ordering the election of delegates for a constitutional convention was brought up but was referred to the next
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1793 session. At a session of the Assembly held in 1793 the
proposal was rejected.
1796
At the October Session 1796 a resolution was passed
requesting the freemen of the several towns to instruct
their representatives during the recess of the Assembly
on the question of calling a convention of delegates to
frame a written constitution.
1797
On J u l y 4,1797, George R. Burrill made an elaborate
argument in favor of the formation of a constitution.
In the same year the General Assembly adopted a
code of laws to become effective in 1798, known as the
Digest of 1798, all other general laws being thereby repealed. It included the Charter, the Declaration of
Independence by Congress and the Acts of Ratification. the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution of
the United States, Washington's Farewell Address,
and certain other acts, among which was "An Act
Declaratory of Certain Rights of the People of This
State." By the last named act it is enacted:
"That the people of this state are entitled,
among other important and essential rights,
to the rights hereafter enumerated, and that
the same are and hereby are declared to be the
inherent and unquestionable rights of the
people inhabiting within the limits and jurisdiction of this state: That the political
axioms, or truths, hereinafter mentioned and
declared, are, and ought to be, of paramount
obligation in all legislative judicial and executive proceedings, which shall be had or
done therein, under the authority thereof."
Then follow ten paragraphs enumerating various rights
which today appear in our constitution as Sec. 5-14
inc. of Article I. Still another act was incorporated in
digest relating to religious liberty which appears as
Sec. 3 of Article I of our constitution.
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From the above it is quite evident that the General
Assembly took unto itself all the powers of government
and acted in a sovereign capacity, except that it could
not alter or amend the Charter or pass laws contrary
to well recognized civil rights. The Digest of 1798 amply demonstrates that for the time being the so-called
constitution met all the requirements of the people and
there was no sustained demand for a new constitution.
At the October Session (1797) of the General Assembly a proposition to call a constitutional convention was negatived by a large majority.
1799 A similar proposal was also rejected by the Assembly
in 1799.
A number of towns having instructed their representatives to endeavor to secure the passage of a resolution
ordering a convention to form a State constitution, the
1806 question was presented at the June, 1806, Session of
the Assembly, but nothing was done regarding the
matter.
1808 Henry Wheaton in a letter, now in the Massachusetts Historical Society, strongly urged the adoption of
a constitution by Rhode Island.
1819 At the February, 1819, Session of the Assembly a
resolution was presented in the House requesting the
freemen at the Annual Election in April, to express
their opinions regarding the expediency of calling a
convention to form a written constitution. The matter
was postponed and a committee appointed to take the
matter into consideration.
1820 Throughout the year 1820 the subject of a constitutional convention was quite generally discussed
throughout the state. A convention was held in Providence to further that object.
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1821

At the J a n u a r y Session, 1821, a resolution was
passed by both houses to submit the question of calling
a constitutional convention to the people at the town
meetings in April.
The question presented read as follows:
" I s it expedient that an act be passed by
the General Assembly providing for the election of delegates by the freemen of the several
towns in the same numbers and proportions
as said towns are now represented in the General Assembly, and organizing said delegates
into a convention for the purpose of forming
a written constitution of government for this
state, such constitution when framed to be
submitted to the freemen for final decision?"
The people voted against the proposal—Ayes 1619,
Noes 1905.

1822

The constitutional convention question again came
up a t J a n u a r y Session 1822 and was again submitted
to the freemen at the April town meetings. Again defeated—843 for—1804 against.
1823
The question of a constitutional convention was a
subject of debate all through the year 1823, both in the
General Assembly and in the State at large. At the
J u n e Session 1823 a resolution was offered which provided for the issuance of a mandatory call for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention, without waiting for the previously attempted popular initiative. The resolution was laid on the table until October when a committee was elected to bring in a bill for
a convention. The committee was unable to agree, and
another committee was appointed for the purpose. The
1824 latter reported at the J a n u a r y 1824 Session. The bill
requested the freemen to choose delegates equal to the
then number of representatives in the House. The reso-
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lution was adopted and the freemen of the towns
elected delegates in J u n e (1824).
The movement appears to have been "non partisan."
The convention met a t Newport in J u n e 1824 and prepared a Constitution to be submitted to the people in
October.
The freemen rejected the proposed constitution—
3206-1668.
The question of a new Constitution again came to
1834 the front in 1834. Delegates from several towns assembled in Providence February 22, 1834, to consult
on the best course to pursue for the establishment of
a written state constitution which should properly define and fix the powers of the different departments of
the Government and the rights of citizens. Another
convention was held for the same purpose March 12,
1834 at which delegates from additional towns were
present. A constitutional party was formed and agitation was continued. At the J u n e Session of the General
Assembly 1834 a motion was presented in the House
to call a convention to annul the Charter. Thomas W.
Dorr, a new member from Providence, moved as a substitute requesting the freemen to choose delegates to a
convention to amend the present or to propose a new
constitution. His motion was carried in an amended
form.
The Convention met in September 1834, adjourned
several times, the last time to meet in Providence on
1835 June 29, 1835, but the members failed to meet on the
latter date.
1837 At the J a n u a r y Session 1837 a resolution by Thomas
W. Dorr to call a constitutional convention was rejected by a vote of 39 to 17.
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1839

In 1839 Thomas W. Dorr, who, previously, had been
quite prominent in the Whig party was now opposed to
that party, as he found the Democratic party, in state
politics, more favorable to the suffrage movement.
In the fall of the year 1840 the R. I. Suffrage Association was formed. It maintained the right of the
people to meet by delegates and form a constitution,
without regard to the absence of authority for such
proceedings in the terms of the Charter.

1841

At the J a n u a r y Session of 1841 a resolution was
adopted requesting the freemen at the August town
and ward meetings to choose delegates, equal in number to the representation of the several municipalities
in the General Assembly, to attend a convention to be
held in Providence on the first Monday of November
1841 to frame a new constitution, either in whole or in
part, and if in part, to take into "special consideration
the expediency of equalizing the representation of the
towns in the house of representatives." The resolution
passed 37-16.
As the convention so called by the General Assembly
was to be elected by the "freemen," the advocates of
"reform" or "suffragists" called a mass meeting of the
friends of extended suffrage to meet in Providence
April 17, 1841. The meeting was held. Another was
held at Newport May 5, 1841. The Newport meeting
adjourned to Providence J u l y 5, 1841 to observe Independence Day (July 4th falling on Sunday).
At the meeting of J u l y 5 resolutions were adopted
ordering the calling of a Convention to frame a constitution. On July 24, 1841 the state committee of the
people issued a call for the election of delegates to a
convention to meet in Providence October 4.
On August 28 delegates were elected.
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Three days later, August 31, at the regular town
meetings, delegates were elected to the convention
which had been called by the General Assembly at the
J a n u a r y (1841) Session.
The convention called as the result of the July 5th
meeting of the people was called the "People's Convention," that called by the General Assembly was called
the "Landholders Convention."
The Peoples Convention convened a t the State
House in Providence on October 4, 1841 and a form of
constitution was adopted known as the "Peoples Constitution."
The Landholders Committee met at the State House
on November 1, 1841 and adopted a form of constitution known as the "Landholders Constitution."
A vote was taken on the question of the adoption of
the Peoples Constitution on December 27, 28, 29, 1841.
The method of voting and the persons allowed to vote
had been arbitrarily established by the Peoples Convention. The result of the vote was 13944 for 52
against the adoption. The advocates of the Peoples
Constitution claimed that the affirmative vote represented a majority of the enlarged suffrage which they
had established and that the vote included a majority
of those who were legal voters under the Charter Government and therefore declared that their constitution
had been adopted.
1842

At the J a n u a r y 1842 Session of the General Assembly (under the Charter) a resolution was introduced
providing for the acceptance of the Peoples Constitution. The resolution failed of passage by a vote of 11
to 57. A resolution was then offered condemning the
action of the Peoples Convention and carried by a vote
of 60 to 7.
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On J a n u a r y 13, by order of the Peoples Convention
a proclamation was issued declaring that the Peoples
Constitution had been adopted.
In February 1842 the Landholders Convention reconvened and revised the form of its proposed constitution by making provisions for an enlarged electorate
and voted to submit its constitution, as so revised, to
popular vote on March 21, 22, 23, 1842.
Prior to the vote on the question the members of the
Supreme Court, Ex-Governors and other public officers
and prominent private persons publicly gave their
opinions t h a t the Peoples Convention was unlawful
and revolutionary. The advocates of the Peoples Constitution were supported by the opinions of a Justice
of the U. S. Court and of nine Democratic lawyers in
the contention that the Peoples Convention was legal
and t h a t the constitution submitted by it had been
legally adopted.
Dorr and his adherents insisted that the Peoples
Constitution had been adopted and advocated the rejection of the Landholders Constitution.
I t was rejected by a vote of 8689 to 8013.
A special session of the General Assembly had been
called to meet in March 1842 and, at that Session, after
the rejection of the Landholders Constitution a motion
was made that the Peoples Constitution be submitted
to a vote of the freeholders which motion was lost 3 to
53.
The Peoples Constitution having been adopted according to the claim of the "suffragists" and the Landholders Constitution having been rejected by the electorate and the government as existing under the Charter refusing to admit or recognize any effect or validity
in the Peoples Constitution a seriously disturbed con-
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dition existed. The suffragists, acting upon their contention that the Peoples Constitution was in effect,
arranged for the election of general officers and a legislation under that "constitution." The "election" was
held April 18, 1842 and a full complement of officers
was "elected."
The regular election of State Officers under the
Charter was held on April 20, 1842 and a full complement of officers was elected.
Each group of officers claimed to be the duly constitutional officials of the State with the inevitable result
of clashes of authority, including overt acts of violence. This condition continued in varying but diminishing degrees until April, 1843.
In the meantime, at the J u n e 1842 Session of the
Charter General Assembly, a resolution was passed
calling for another constitutional convention. Such a
convention was held at East Greenwich September to
November 5, 1842 when its work of framing a constitution was completed. The document prepared by that
convention was submitted to the electorate on November 21, 22, 23, 1842 and adopted by a vote of 7032 to
59. This is the constitution which, with sundry amendments, continues in force at the present time (1935).
An election under the constitution so adopted in
November, 1842 was held in April, 1843, and in May of
that year, at Newport, the Government under t h a t constitution was inaugurated and the government under
the Charter which had been in continual existence for
180 years ceased to be.
The "suffragists" in large measure submitted to or
acquiesced in the situation, although to some extent
and from time to time thereafter agitation for further
constitutional changes has been continued resulting in

357
the amendments which have become part of the fundamental law of the State.
Such agitation, in addition to bringing about the
adoption of those amendments, led to the submission
of other amendments which were not adopted to proposals in the General Assembly for calling constitutional conventions which were defeated and occasioned
other legislative action, also expressions of judicial
opinion relative to the manner by which amendments
might lawfully be effected. References to some of the
events which occurred after the adoption of the Constitution follow.
1853

At the May Session 1853 a resolution was adopted
requesting the freemen of the several municipalities to
vote, on J u n e 28, for or against a constitutional convention, and at the same time to elect delegates to such
a convention. The proposition was defeated by a vote
of 6282 to 4570.
At the October Session in the same year the General
Assembly passed an act providing for the submission
to the people of certain questions connected with a
constitutional convention. At an election held November 21, 1853 the questions were answered in the negative by a vote of 3778 for, to 7618 against.

1881

At the General Assembly which was elected in 1881
an amendment to the constitution was proposed which,
if adopted would have conferred upon the Assembly
the authority to provide for calling conventions to
revise, alter or amend the constitution and to submit
the actions of such convention to the electors for approval or rejection.
The proposed amendment was approved by the next
Assembly which was elected in 1882 and was submitted
to the electors in November of that year.

358
The amendment was rejected by a vote of 4393 approving and 5125 rejecting.
1883
In 1883 the justices of the Supreme Court were asked
to give an advisory opinion regarding the method or
methods by which the constitution might legally be
amended. In response the justices advised that amendments might be effected only in the manner prescribed
in the constitution and not by means of a convention.
See 14 R. I. 651.
1897

At the May Session 1897 an act was passed providing for a commission of fifteen members to revise the
constitution. The commission which was appointed
under the act reported a revised document in February
1898 1898. The General Assembly ( J a n u a r y Session 1898)
adopted the same as a proposed amendment to the
constitution. I t was likewise adopted at the May Session 1898 and submitted to the people in November of
that year but failed to receive a sufficient vote of approval, the voting being 17360 for and 13510 against.
1899 With slight changes the document was again submitted to the people in J u n e 1899 and again was rejected, the vote being 4097 for and 12742 against.
COMMENTS

The foregoing brief references to the constitutional history of Rhode Island are here included principally for the
purpose of disclosing the conditions which existed in 184143 at the times when the "Peoples," the "Landholders" and
the now existing constitutions were framed, the history
which had preceded that period of time and the keen appreciation which the authors of those documents must have
had of the very proposition which is now involved in the
question or questions which have been submitted for the
opinion and advice of your Honors.
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In the first place it is pertinent to observe that the three
documents vary, one from the others, only in a few particlars and that these variations are relatively unimportant
and that none of the variations affect the present inquiry,
in any great degree.
I t is plain that in 1841-43 the most important differences
of opinion in regard to the provisions which should be incorporated in a constitution were in relation to the extension of the suffrage and the proportionate representation of
the several towns in the General Assembly.
The fundamental point of difference between the contending parties (a difference of much greater importance than
any difference regarding the provisions which should be
included in a constitution) related to the method and procedure by which a constitution could be adopted, particularly the question—what inhabitants of the State had the
right to take part in bringing about such adoption and the
course which they should pursue in order to obtain their
desires.
With the knowledge that that paramount issue was ever
present and ever would be present in the f u t u r e when agitation for constitutional changes might arise, and that that
issue had been the subject of persistent and acrimonious
discussion and absolute differences of conviction for many
years, it is inconceivable that either Dorr and his followers
on the one hand, or those who held opposing views on the
other hand, should have, intentionally or by oversight, omitted from the constitutions which they prepared, positive provisions with reference to the rights of "the people" to
initiate changes in the f u t u r e if they or any of them had
intended that, after the adoption of a constitution, the people
should have any right to initiate amendments in any manner except as specifically provided. It cannot be that either
party intended to leave to inference a right which was then
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such a vital issue if it was their purpose that that right could
be exercised or claimed in later years.
Nevertheless none of the documents contains a provision
either specifically reserving such right to the people or conferring such right upon the people or any provision denying
such right, but each document does specifically provide for
amendments to be initiated by the Assembly. The provisions
in the three constitutions (Article X I I I in each) are essentially the same with the exception that the Peoples Constitution provides that amendments when finally approved by
a majority of the voters, shall become effective, whereas the
other documents provide that approval by three-fifths of the
voters shall be necessary.
Particularly it is most significant that a provision expressly and definitely saving and reserving a right of revision and amendment to the people is omitted from the
Peoples Constitution, a document of which Dorr was undoubtedly the principal author, and which was unqualifiedly
approved by his followers, and in the defence of the principles of which he incurred dangers, imprisonment and other
hardships.
The principles upon which the Peoples Convention proceeded when it assembled to d r a f t the constitution which was
later submitted to the people were these—namely that, as no
provision for changing the fundamental law then existed and
as no power to change that law then existed except in the
people, they (the people) had the right to effect such changes
as they desired.
Those principles were clearly stated by Dorr in an address
which he made to the convention, but he also emphasized the
proposition "When there is a mode of amendment provided
by the constitution of a State, it ought to be followed."
Following are his words as quoted from Burke's Report,
page 863. (Burke's report to the National House of Representatives 28th Congress, 1st Session, 1844.)
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"The charter contains no clause of amendment;
because the power to amend resided in the king,
who granted it by his 'especial grace, certain knowledge and mere motion.' Neither the people at large
in this State, nor the freeholding people, have ever
adopted a Constitution; and of course, they have
prescribed no mode of amendment. The Assembly
have never passed any general law providing the
mode of procedure to amend the government. They
have only made requests from time to time, which
have never been complied with, except by the convening of delegates to receive their pay. And further, there is no usage in this State which points
out the mode of amendment. The clear conclusion
therefore is. that the people of this State, whoever
they are, have a right to proceed to amend their
government, without a call, in just such manner
and time as they may see fit; and I have endeavored
to show that the people are the citizens in general,
the successors to the former sovereign of Rhode
Island."
"So far, therefore, from our proceeding being irregular or revolutionary, they are strictly in order,
and in conformity with the will of the people, and
could not be strengthened by any possible form of
request from the present government. Where there
is a mode of amendment prescribed by the constitution of a State, it ought to be followed. But suppose
the constitution of a State—of Massachusetts, for
instance—were silent on this one point, and prescribed no way to proceed. I ask, who would have
the power to amend that constitution, The electors
named in it, No; for all the subjects upon which
they can vote are specified in the instrument. The
legislature: No, for this is not named among their
powers. The only remaining alternative is, that the
people at large, the source of all power, have the
right to amend the government, as they originally
had the right to make it." [Italics ours]
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I t may be urged, as it has been at times in the past, that
under each of the constitutions (i. e. the Peoples and the one
which was adopted and is now in force), and notwithstanding the omission of positive provisions, the right of the people to effect changes independently of those which may be
initiated by the Assembly as provided in Article X I I I of
each document were nevertheless declared, saved and reserved, with the right, by inference, to effect such changes
without following the method prescribed in the constitution.
The ground for such contention is found, in the case of the
Peoples Constitution, in section 3 of Article I (Declaration
of Principles and Rights) which reads as follows:
"the people have an unalienable and indefeasible
right, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited
capacity to ordain and institute government, and in
the same capacity to alter, reform, or totally change
the same whenever their safety or happiness requires."
and in the case of the present existing constitution is found
in Section 1 of Article I (Declaration of Certain Constitutional Rights and Principles) which reads as follows:
"We declare that the basis of our political systems
is the right of the people to make and alter their
constitutions of government; but that the constitution which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is
sacredly obligatory upon all."
It is understood that when the drafting of the present
constitution was under consideration in the convention a
proposal was made that the above quoted statement from the
Peoples Constitution be included, but that the proposal was
rejected in favor of the statement last above reported. The
last quoted clause is significant and the reason for its adoption is self-apparent.
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I t will be noted that neither of the constitutions contains
any provision setting forth any method or procedure whereby
the declared right of the people may be exercised, except only
as is provided in Article X I I I of each document (the method
which involves Legislative initiative). There is no provision
for or suggestion of a right to effect changes by means of a
convention.
The failure to include any provision expressly permitting
amendments to be initiated by the convention method or
provision asserting the right of the people to act on their
own initiative constitutes (in the light of the agitation and
discussions which had preceded and in view of the transcendent importance of the subject) cogent evidence that
Dorr and his followers, as well as the citizens who approved
the Landholders Constitution and the constitution which is
now in force, intended and unanimously agreed that the
right of the people to thereafter constitutionally change their
fundamental law should be safeguarded and restrained by
limiting the exercise of that right to the method which was
similarly set forth in each of the three constitutions.
The leaders of each of the factions engaged in the struggle for constitutional reform were men of intelligence and
convictions, including many lawyers whose records disclose
their great ability both in debate and in the draughtsmanship of documents. It is not possible that such men, at such
a time and under the conditions which then prevailed, would
have failed, when preparing the documents which were to
be submitted to the people for adoption as constitutions, to
include explicit provisions enabling the people constitutionally to amend by the convention method as well as by the
prescribed method, if it had been the intention to give constitutional effect to such right. Neither is it possible that
the people would have adopted as their constitution a document from which a provision unequivocally enabling the
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exercise of such right was omitted, if they (the people) intended to exercise such right under the constitution.
Any draughtsman of ordinary ability and experience, intending to give constitutional effect to a right of amendment
greater than that which is expressed would have added to
the statements of "Declaration of Rights and Principles" the
words—"and such right, in addition to the exercise thereof
in the manner which is provided in Article X I I I of this Constitution, may be exercised by the people by means of conventions called for the purpose or in any other manner which
they may from time to time determine."
The omission of such a declaration is of profound and conclusive significance.
Furthermore, how can either of the above quoted statements (Sec. 3 of Art. I of the Peoples Constitution and Sec.
1 of Art, I of the present constitution) be construed as enabling the people to exercise any broader, greater or different right and power to change their constitution than is
provided for in the thirteenth articles of those constitutions?
If the provisions of Article X I I I in each constitution are not
intended to be restrictive on the people themselves for what
purpose are they included? If the people, by convention
or by any manner other than as provided in Article X I I I , can
lawfully change their fundamental charter of government
and override the requirements of that provision, to what end
and for what purpose was that article included? The answer
must be—None—It is an idle, useless and ineffectual addition to a solemn and important document.
As no change proposed by the Assembly can become effective until approved by the people, it is manifest that the
purpose of the other provisions contained in Article X I I I is
to assure a reasonable period of delay, a period for consideration and reconsideration, in order to avoid hasty and ill considered action and it is also apparent that it was the inten-
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tion of the people, in adopting their constitution, that they
desired and intended to limit the exercise of their constitutional right in the manner specified.
In addition to all the foregoing considerations, it has been
positively and affirmatively demonstrated that the people do
not desire that revision or amendments shall be effected by
means of conventions.
A definite proposal to amend the present constitution by
adding a specific provision for such conventions was submitted to the people in the year 1882 as hereinbefore stated.
That proposal was rejected by a vote 4393 for and 5125
against, a total vote of 9518 on the question.
That vote was taken in November, 1882. At the election
for general officers that same year a total vote of 15523 was
cast for the candidates for governor.
Therefore it is apparent that only 61% of the electorate
which voted for the candidates for governor was interested
in the question of the proposed constitutional amendment,
and that only slightly more than 28% of the electorate was
in favor of the change, while 33% of the electorate was definitely opposed.
The suggestion has been made that the provision for
amendments contained in Article X I I I permits the Assembly to initiate only incidental or partial changes and does
not confer power to suggest complete revision. We submit
that no such limitation of power was intended but that the
term "amendments" is used in its most comprehensive sense
which includes adding, changing, substituting or omitting,
that a comprehensive revision would be an "amendment" and
that it was the intent and purpose of "the people" that the
ample method for effecting amendments which is provided
in the article should be the comprehensive and exclusive
constitutional method of effecting whatever changes might
appear desirable in the course of time.
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I t cannot be that the framers of the constitution intended
to safeguard the fundamental rights of the people against
partial changes and at the same time leave those rights exposed to sweeping changes and obliteration without, at least,
equal protection against hasty action.
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SUPREME COURT

IN . R E :
R E Q U E S T OF GOVERNOR FOR AN OPINION

Brief Submitted by Counsel Delegated by the Rhode
Island Bar Association as Amici Curiae by Leave of
Court in Opposition to the Legislative Power and Authority of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode
Island to Call a Convention to Revise or Amend the
Constitution.
Acting under the provisions of Section 2 of Article X I I
of Amendments to the Constitution, the Governor has requested the opinion of this Court on the following questions
of law:
I. STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power
if the General Assembly should provide by law
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend
the Constitution of the State;
" ( b ) that the Governor shall call for the election, at
a date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such convention in such number and manner as the General Assembly shall determine;
" ( c ) that the General Officers of the State shall by
virtue of their offices be members of such convention;
" ( d ) for the organization and conduct of such convention ;
" ( e ) for the submission to the people, for their ratification and adoption, of any constitution or amendments proposed by such convention ; and
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" ( f ) for declaring the result and effect of the vote
a majority of the electors voting upon the question
of such ratification and adoption?"
With the approval of the Court the Executive Committee
of the Rhode Island Bar Association has appointed two attorneys to present the affirmative and two the negative sides
of these questions, and this brief is presented by the undersigned in support of the view that all of the questions submitted ought to be answered in the negative.
It is not clear whether the six questions are in effect a
unit, or separate and independent questions, and they will be
considered both as independent questions and also as parts
of a single plan, i. e., as the initial and successive steps in a
single suggested method of revision. The meaning of the
questions in this particular should be interpreted by the
Court. (See infra, IV, page 68.)
Whether considered together or separately, however, the
exact meaning of question (a) and the answer to be given to
it is vital, since all of the following questions are dependent
upon its answer. Most of them, indeed, can be construed in
no other way as they refer repeatedly to "such convention,"
i. e., the convention referred to in question (a).
We therefore address ourselves first to the question propounded as follows:
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power
if the General Assembly should provide by law
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend
the Constitution of the State;"

II. QUESTION (a) SHOULD BE ANSWERED
IN THE NEGATIVE
A. Historical Background to 1843
As other briefs are to be filed on the same side, in which
we understand a relatively full history of the constitutional
government of the State will be set forth, we shall not at-
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tempt to cover the same ground in complete detail, but will
confine ourselves to pointing out the most salient historical
facts bearing upon the questions at issue.
The Royal Charter of 1663 (with a brief intermission during the Andros administration) and with formal changes
made necessary by the State's Declaration of Independence
on May 4, 1776, was the supreme law of the Colony and State
until the adoption of the present Constitution in 1842—
which became effective in the spring of 1843. After said
Declaration of Independence, it was repeatedly referred to
as the "Constitution." (See, for example, preamble and resolution of the General Assembly of February, 1783, Volume
IX, Colonial Records, 635.)
In 1777, the General Assembly appointed a committee to
form a plan of government, without definite results. In 1792,
a proposal to elect delegates to a constitutional convention
was postponed. In 1797 a proposal to call a constitutional
convention was defeated in the Assembly, and occasionally
thereafter similar proposals were made.
In 1821, however, the first resolution was passed to submit the question of calling a constitutional convention to the
people, but the proposal was defeated by the people. Again
in 1822 it was submitted to the freemen and was again defeated.
In 1824, pursuant to act of the General Assembly calling
a constitutional convention, such a convention met and prepared a Constitution which was rejected by popular vote.
This was the first constitutional convention in this State.
In 1834, as a result of continued agitation, the Assembly
issued a second call for a convention, which met but finally
adjourned without definite action.
In 1837, a resolution proposed by Thomas W. Dorr to call
a convention was rejected by the Assembly.
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In 1841, the General Assembly issued its third call for a
constitutional convention, resulting in the holding of a third
constitutional convention known as the "Freemen's" or
"Landholders' " Convention. Meanwhile, in August, 1841,
pursuant to a call issued by the Dorr faction through its
State committee, delegates were elected to the so-called "People's Convention", which met in October 1841 and framed
the "People's Constitution", upon which a vote was taken
in December with the following result:
13,944
For
Against,
52
In January, 1842, a resolution was introduced into the
General Assembly to provide for the acceptance of the People's Constitution, which failed of passage.
In March, 1842, the Freemen's Constitution was rejected
by the following vote:
For. . . .
8,013
8,689
Against.
After the Dorr faction organized the government under
the alleged "People's Convention", there followed for some
months a period during which there were two purported
forms of government, (1) under the Charter, and (2) under
the People's Constitution, each of which considered the
other unlawful. This situation resulted in the clash of authority known as the "Dorr War".
During that period, the General Assembly elected under
the Charter provided by resolution for calling another constitutional convention which was duly held, actually framed
our present Constitution, and submitted it to the electors in
November, 1842, by whom it was adopted by the following
vote:
For
7,032
Against
59
By its terms it became effective in May, 1843.
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The Constitution framed by the People's Convention and
the Constitution framed by the Freemen's Convention both
included an Article XIII in all essential respects like the
present Article XIII, except that that adopted by the People's Convention provided for ratification by the people by a
majority instead of by a three-fifths vote. All three Constitutions omitted any article or clause providing for amendment through the means of a convention. And Mr. Dorr himself, in an address which he made to the People's Convention,
stated that
"Where there is a mode of amendment prescribed by
the Constitution of a State, it ought to be followed."
(See Burke's Report to The National House of Representatives, Twenty-eighth Congress, First Session, 1844.)
The question as to the manner in which the present Constitution can properly be amended has, from time to time,
been the subject of extended controversy, although, after the
rendition by the Supreme Court of the Opinion of the
Judges in re Constitutional Convention in 1883, reported in
14 R. I. 649, and the gradual dying down of the heated discussions and exchanges of pamphlets which immediately
followed, we believe it fair to say that the matter was, for a
substantial period of time, considered to have been finally
settled in this State. About ten years ago, however, a group
of twenty-six prominent Democratic lawyers prepared a brief
in support of their opinion that a constitutional convention
could still legally be held. I t is important, however, in this
connection to note that emphasis was laid upon the propriety of submitting the question of the calling of such a
convention to the people, rather than of having it called
directly by the General Assembly.
As a result of the lengthy and comprehensive arguments,
pro and con, at the various times when these questions were
under serious discussion, the ground has been pretty thor-
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oughly covered; and we are left to face the fact that there
are two schools of thought upon the fundamental question
here involved which it appears impossible to reconcile. Yet
both cannot be right in the legal and constitutional sense;
and it is for us to lay before the Court what, in our judgment, is the constitutional law of this State as established
by the history of the controversy, by the principles which are
involved, and by the precedents which have been established.
For a period of ninety-two years, i. e. since the adoption
of our present Constitution, this State is without any precedent from which it can be argued that the legal answer to
the first question propounded is "Yes". Not once from 1843
until the present hour has the General Assembly passed an
act or resolution to call a constitutional convention. The
period mentioned comprises more than half of the whole time
during which we have existed as a State.
Prior to 1843, as above indicated, there were frequent attempts to provide for a new Constitution through the use of
the convention method. That course was natural and indeed
necessary. The Royal Charter having been granted by the
King of course provided no machinery for its amendment
by the people, and if it was to be amended it must be ex necessitate through the calling of such a convention. That was,
we believe, the normal procedure adopted in all of the thirteen original States, except in one or two cases where constitutions were actually imposed upon the people by their existing representative bodies. At all events, by 1840 it was
the recognized mode in which constitutions were to be established in the absence of any prescribed mode for amendment
in their fundamental law, and in this State, besides the "People's Convention" of 1842, there had been called and convened three earlier constitutional conventions without any
new constitution having been adopted. From 1824 on, the
question was a burning one and the agitation continued, cul-
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minating in the three separate conventions in 1841-1842
(People's, Freemen's, and Final) and the major political disturbance occasioned by the Dorr War.
Said Final Convention, held in 1842, framed our present
Constitution which was ratified by a majority of the electors
who voted thereon. I t was prepared by men who were the
leaders in the political life of the State, including the late
William P. Sheffield of Newport, who had served on a committee to which had previously been referred various memorials and petitions praying that a convention be called.

B. Consideration of Articles I, IV said XIII
of the Constitution
In that Constitution there were three Articles which both
sides usually concede have the most direct bearing upon our
question. They are these:
"ARTICLE

I.

" S E C T I O N 1. In the words of the Father of his Country, we declare that 'the basis of our political systems
is the right of the people to make and alter their constitutions of government; but that the constitution
which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and
authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory
upon all.'
"ARTICLE

IV.

This constitution shall be the supreme
law of the state, and any law inconsistent therewith
shall be void. . . .
"SEC. 2. The legislative power under this constitution shall be vested in two houses, the one to be called
the senate, the other the house of representatives; and
both together the general assembly. . . .
"SEC. 10. The general assembly shall continue to exercise the powers which they have heretofore exercised,
unless prohibited in this constitution.
"SECTION 1.
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"ARTICLE

XIII.

"OF Amendments.
"The general assembly may propose amendments to
this constitution by the votes of a majority of all the
members elected to each house. Such propositions for
amendment shall be published in the newspapers, and
printed copies of them shall be sent by the secretary
of state, with the names of all the members who shall
have voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, to all the
town and city clerks in the state. The said propositions
shall be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants or
notices by them issued, for warning the next annual
town and ward meetings in April; and the clerks shall
read said propositions to the electors when thus assembled, with the names of all the representatives and
senators who shall have voted thereon, with the yeas
and nays, before the election of senators and representatives shall be had. If a majority of all the members elected to each house, a t said annual meeting, shall
approve any proposition thus made, the same shall be
published and submitted to the electors in the mode
provided in the act of approval; and if then approved
by three-fifths of the electors of the state present and
voting thereon in town and ward meetings, it shall
become a part of the constitution of the state."
Now on the face of things it would look as though, if the
Constitution were to be amended, the mode of such amendment was specifically pointed out; that it was the intention
of the framers and the people that while it could be changed
(i. e., amended or revised) any change must have the approval of two succeeding legislatures, intervening publication,
and final approval by three-fifths of the electors; and t h a t
this method is exclusive upon the ancient and well recognized
principle, in Roman and subsequent jurisprudence that "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." If that doctrine is properly applicable the convention method is prohibited.
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1. In re the Constitutional
649, and resulting discussion.

Convention,

14 R. I.

As everyone knows, that was the precise point passed upon
by the Supreme Court in its advisory opinion In Re The
Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649 (March 30, 1883).
The Senate, by resolution, requested an answer to two questions :
" I . As to the legal competency thereof under the
Constitution of the State to call upon the electors to
elect members to constitute a convention to frame a new
Constitution of the State, and to provide that the new
Constitution should be submitted for adoption, either
to the qualified electors of the State, or to the persons
who would be entitled to vote under said new Constitution, for adoption, and if a majority of such electors
or persons voting should vote in favor thereof, whether
the new Constitution would then become the legally
adopted Constitution of the State and be binding as
such upon all of the people thereof.
" I I . As to whether it is legally competent for the
General Assembly to submit to the qualified electors
the question whether said electors will call a convention to frame a new Constitution, and to provide by
law if a majority of the electors voting upon said question shall vote in favor of calling such convention, that
the same be held, and the new Constitution framed by
said Convention be submitted to the electors for their
adoption, either to the electors qualified by law, or to
the persons who may be qualified to vote under such
new Constitution, and whether if a majority of the
electors, or persons voting thereon, vote for the adoption
of such Constitution, whether the Constitution so to be
framed and adopted would be the legal Constitution
of the State, and as such be binding upon all the people
thereof."
In a reply, written by Chief Justice Thomas Durfee, and
in which Justices Matteson, Stiness, Tillinghast and Car-
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penter, the other four members of the Court, concurred, it
was ruled that the specified mode of amendment was exclusive, and that therefore it could be amended in no other way,
the Court saying:
" I t is inconceivable to us that they (our ancestors)
would have elaborated so guarded a mode of amendment unless they had intended to have it exclusive and
controlling. They doubtless did so intend, and if they
did, we cannot say they did not, simply because since
then the Constitutions of other States, having similar
provisions, have been amended through the medium of
conventions. . . . Our Constitution is, by its own
express declaration, the supreme law of the State; any
law inconsistent with it is void, and, therefore, if the
provision which it contains for its own amendment is
exclusive, implying a prohibition of amendments in any
other manner, then, of course, any act of the assembly
providing for a convention to amend the Constitution
is unconstitutional and void" (page 653).
At page 651, the Court also says, by way of direct answer
to the two questions, the following:
"In reply we have to say t h a t we are of opinion that
the mode provided in the Constitution for the amendment thereof is the only mode in which it can be constitutionally amended. The ordinary rule is t h a t where
power is given to do a thing in a particular way, there
the affirmative words, marking out the particular way,
prohibit all other ways by implication, so that the particular way is the only way in which the power can be
legally executed"
and cites various cases in support of this general principle.
To the claim that the rule is inapplicable in the interpretation of State Constitutions, the Court says:
"The rule is simply a guide to the meaning of
language when used in a particular way, and we do not
see why it is not as trustworthy a guide to the meaning
when the language so used occurs in the State Consti-
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tution, as when it occurs in a statute or a will. Men
do not put away their spontaneous and habitual modes
of expressing themselves merely because they are engaged in the unaccustomed work of framing or adopting
a constitution,"
citing Opinion of the Justices} 6 Cush. (Mass.) 573 (1833)
in which, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Shaw, it
was declared that the Constitution of Massachusetts was constitutionally amendable only as therein provided. After
stating that the provision for amendment in our Constitution is "singularly explicit," the Court says that
"Evidently the purpose was to ensure the calm and
considerate action of both the assembly and the people.
It was to pass two assemblies, so that the members of the
second, elected after publication, might, if the electors
thought proper, be elected especially to consider it.
The popular mind was not to be taken by surprise or to
be carried away by any sudden whim, but it was to
act deliberately after reflection. To this end the threefifths vote was required for approval. The object was
not to hamper or baffle the popular will, but to ensure
its full expression. Our ancestors well knew, what we
all know, that in spite of all precautions a majority
may be worked up for an occasion which is not a true
and permanent majority.
". . . If," the Court says, "the provision for amendment was impracticable, there might be, if no legal
reason, yet some excuse for disregarding it, but it is
practicable, as a successful resort to it in several instances has demonstrated. The only things which can
be said against it are that it is dilatory and that it requires the assent of more than a bare majority. But
these are the very things which recommended it to its
authors and therefore they cannot be alleged as reasons
for believing that they did not mean it to be exclusive
and controlling."
And the Court well points out, in answer to an argument
t h a t a convention is in any event proper where general
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changes are to be made, that in view of the requirements of
the Federal Constitution and since the present Constitution
contains the great ground plan of any such form of government as can be recognized as proper thereunder,
"Any new Constitution . . . which a convention
would form would be a new Constitution only in name;
but would be, in fact, our present Constitution amended. It is impossible for us to imagine any alteration
consistent with a republican form of government, which
cannot be effected by specific amendment as provided in
the Constitution."
The Court holds that Section 10 of Article IV, authorizing
the General Assembly to exercise the powers heretofore exercised, does not save the matter, for under that Section they
can exercise only powers which are not prohibited, and that
therefore, as the calling of a convention is prohibited by implication, the power cannot be exercised. Citing Taylor vs.
Place, 4 R. I. 324.
As to a contention which has often been made, and which
may be made in this case that
"there is a great unwritten common law of the States
which existed before the Constitution and which the
Constitution was powerless to modify or abolish, under
which the people have the right, whenever invited by
the General Assembly, to alter and amend their Constitution."
the Court says:
"If there be any such law, for there is no record of it,
or of any legislation or custom in this State recognizing
it, then it is, in our opinion, rather a law, if law it can
be called, of revolutionary than of constitutional
change. Our Constitution is, as is already stated by
its own terms 'the supreme law of this State.' We
know of no law, except the constitution and laws of the
United States, which is superior to it."
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Almost at once this opinion became the target for heated
criticisms. Every argument upon which the Court proceeded
was attacked and it was even suggested that the six-day
period during which the Court had the matter under consideration must have been insufficient for proper reflection.
I t was also pointed out that the opinion did not carry the
same authority as a decision in a litigated case because it
did not constitute a judicial precedent binding upon the
Court in the ordinary sense. The latter point is conceded,
and so f a r as we know has never been the subject of serious
dispute.
The criticism of the time element, however, was both unfair and unjustifiable. The question was not a new one in
the State. Judge Durfee, in his brilliant monograph, published in 1884, entitled "Some Thoughts on the Constitution
of Rhode Island" (Sidney S. Rider, 1884), and which constitutes a scholarly and comprehensive justification, were it
needed, of the opinion, states that the matter had been
brought to his attention thirty years before by the then Chief
Justice Richard W. Greene, who had denounced proceedings
in New York to "amend the Constitution of New York
through the medium of a convention without following the
method prescribed in it," and adds that the Opinion had the
assent of all five Judges and was not precipitate. We may
add what everyone knows, that Judge Durfee was one of the
very greatest Judges whom this State has ever produced.
Probably Chief Justice Ames alone was his peer.
From that time to the present, when the matter has been
under discussion, it has been fashionable for the opposition
to make little of the application of the principle that expressio unius est exclusio alterius. But looked at in its historical
light, no rule of interpretation could be more sensible. In
this State, prior to 1843, convention and constitution making
were matters under almost constant discussion. That was the
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recognized mode in which constitutions were to be initiated.
Five conventions (including Dorr) were actually called, and
four actually met, three of them (People's, Freemen's and
Final) in 1841 and 1842. The men who framed as well as the
people who adopted the present Constitution had lived and
were living in this atmosphere. They or many of them had
sat in the conventions. This Constitution itself came out of
such a body. Besides that, Constitutions, mostly produced
by conventions, had by that time been adopted in every one
of the other States, and in numbers of them express provision
was made for their amendment by the convention, as distinguished from the legislative, method. It is simply impossible
for them not to have known that one common mode of amending a Constitution was through a convention, and it is equally impossible for us to believe that if they had intended the
convention method to have been available in this State, they
would not have said so. That they were men of insight as
well as adepts in the use of language appears from the provisions of the great instrument which they drew. Yet, notwithstanding the foregoing, not only they but also the delegates to the People's Convention and to the Freemen's Convention, held just previously, studiously omitted any word or
phrase relating to amendment by convention; and Thomas
W. Dorr, speaking before the People's Convention, stated
that where a mode of amendment was prescribed by a Constitution it ought to be followed. That all these bodies had the
principle of amendment in mind, of course, appears from the
fact that they expressly provided for it, i. e., in Article X I I I ,
and they provided for it in a particularly guarded and explicit manner. In the Constitution as finally adopted, this
Article was construed, immediately after its adoption, in this
particular, both by Chief Justice Job Durfee and by Professor William G. Goddard, a professor in civics, who was chosen to give an address to the incoming Assembly which convened immediately after the Constitution was adopted.
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Judge Durfee, in charging the grand jury at Newport at
the August term of 1843, said:
"With the exception of a few restrictions, the Legislative power, by an express provision of the Constitution remains the same as under the charter. Among
these restrictions, is one of great importance. I t relates to the manner in which the Constitution may be
amended. When a Constitution prescribes no particular mode of amendment, it is by no means to be inferred
from t h a t fact t h a t it cannot be amended. On the contrary, the power of amendment is more ample than with
a particular provision for t h a t purpose. In such case
the organized people, acting through their legislature,
may prescribe any mode that may be deemed most expedient, taking care not to violate those fundamental
principles of individual right which lie at the foundations of all constitutional governments. But when a
particular mode is pointed out in the Constitution it
must be pursued, for to disregard i t is to act in violation of a constitutional provision which we are all. and
particularly the sworn officers of the State, under the
most solemn obligations to support. A change brought
about by any other mode than that prescribed by the
Constitution, when such mode is prescribed by it, would
be revolutionary. Here we must be governed by the
provisions of our Constitution. The sworn officers of
the State must not incur the guilt of perjury by violating them, and we must all recollect, that when we
wilfully and knowingly depart from them there is no
middle ground on which we can stop in our revolutionary progress, short of unmitigated absolute military
despotism. Once establish it as constitutional lawr in
this Union, that an article providing for the amendment of a Constitution may be disregarded, or a change
of government effected without pursuing a legal course,
and the last trumpet has sounded and the day of doom
has come to our political institutions." (Cited in Durfee, "Some Thoughts on the Constitution of Rhode
Island.")
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Upon the same point, Professor Goddard, in his address,
said
"The people of Rhode Island having determined to
establish a constitution which, as f a r as practicable,
should perpetuate the institutions transmitted to them
by their fathers, have wisely guarded t h a t constitution
against the dangers of precipitate and disastrous innovation. They have placed no insurmountable obstructions in the way of such reforms as experience may
indicate to be necessary. They have, however, rendered it difficult for any faction, however cunning or
however turbulent, to break down any of the essential
conservative provisions of the Constitution. The danger of all precipitate action on the part of the Legislature is excluded, and no organic change can be consummated without the consent of a majority of threefifths of the people, voting thereon in the primary assemblies—thus ensuring the consent of an actual majority of the whole people. These wise and salutary
provisions will protect our State against fierce political
controversies touching the very foundations of the government under which we live. Under free institutions
the people must be expected to differ about men and
measures of policy; but the whole social order is in
danger, the securities of life, liberty and property, are
in danger whenever it becomes the fashion of the day
to project changes in the fundamental law, and to
effect those changes by inflammatory appeals to the
passions and interests of political parties."
And that this was the meaning of Article X I I I is f u r t h e r
asserted and, we believe, established by Mr. Sheffield himself
in his pamphlet entitled "The Mode of Altering the Constitution of Rhode Island," published in 1887 and now on file
in The Providence Athenaeum, Reference 2 J T Sh3m, to
which we respectfully refer the Court. I t will be observed
that Mr. Sheffield was himself a leading member of the convention which adopted the Constitution and participated in
drafting the same.
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C. History and Usage Since 1843
What has been the history and usage upon the point in
Rhode Island since 1843?
I t is this: In 1853 the General Assembly twice submitted
to the voters, not amendments to the Constitution or a new
Constitution, but the question whether a constitutional convention ought to be called. Both proposals were rejected by
the people, the second time by what Judge Durfee calls "an
increase over the first vote too significant not to be understood." (Durfee Pamphlet, page 30).

1. A proposed amendment in 1882 to authorize the
legislature to call constitutional conventions was rejected.
Perhaps the most important single incident bearing on the
matter which has ever occurred here was the result of a constitutional amendment proposed in 1882, the data on which
we obtain from a memorandum prepared some years ago by
Walter F. Angell, Esq.
In 1882, the Legislature of Rhode Island had before it
various memorials and petitions praying that a convention
be called to form a new Constitution for the State. All these
memorials and petitions were referred to a joint select committee, of which William P. Sheffield of Newport was the
chairman, being the same gentleman who had been a member
of the convention which framed the present Constitution of
the State. And it is fair to presume, therefore, that he knew
what powers as to the calling of a constitutional convention
the body in which he sat intended to give the General Assembly.
Mr. Sheffield, and with him the remainder of the committee, was of the opinion that the General Assembly had no
authority to call such a convention. Mr. Sheffield and his
committee, nevertheless (considering the number and standing of the petitioners), concluded that it was their duty to
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recommend to the General Assembly to propose to the electors of the State an amendment to the Constitution, which
amendment, if adopted by the people, would authorize the
General Assembly to call a constitutional convention, and
they submitted a resolution proposing such an amendment
in the following f o r m :
"Resolved, A majority of all the members elected to
each house of the general assembly voting therefor, that
the following amendment to the constitution of the
State be proposed to the qualified electors of the State,
in accordance with the provisions of Article X I I I of the
constitution, for their adoption, to be denominated
Article V of Amendments, to w i t :
"ARTICLE

V.

"The general assembly may, a majority of all the
members elected to each house voting therefor, authorize the qualified electors of the several towns and
cities to elect as many delegates to a constitutional
convention as the said towns and cities are respectively
entitled to elect members of both houses of the general
assembly, and the delegates when elected shall assemble
in convention at a time and place to be provided by
law, and may then revise, alter or amend the constitution; but no such revision, alteration or amendment
shall take effect unless when the same is first submitted
to the qualified electors of the State for their adoption,
in a manner to be provided by law, three-fifths of all
the said electors voting thereon shall have voted in
favor of such revision, alteration or amendment."
This resolution was passed by two General Assemblies,
both Republican. Acts and Resolves, January, 1882, page
275. Acts and Resolves, May, 1882, page 7.
The amendment was submitted to the electors on November 8, 1882 (the day of the election for representatives in
Congress), and was defeated by the following vote:

